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T

emporary help employment grew
dramatically over the last decade,
accounting for 10 percent of net
employment growth in the United States
during the 1990s. Evidence from case
studies and business surveys suggests
dramatic growth in the outsourcing of
functions to contract companies as well
(Abraham and Taylor 1996; Houseman
2001). Through case studies in a
representative manufacturing, service, and
public sector industry, we examined why
employers are increasing the use of these
nonstandard employment arrangements
and the implications of this increased use
for wages, benefits, and working
conditions in low-skilled labor markets.
Temporary help and contract company
workers perform work for a client,
usually at the client’s work site, but they
are the legal employees of an agency or
contract company. Because workers in
these arrangements often receive lower
compensation than they would if they
were employees of the client
organization, the growth of temporary
help and contracting out generally is
viewed as inimical to workers’ interests.
We find, however, that the story is not that
simple. Our case study evidence points to
circumstances in which workers are likely
to be adversely affected by the

outsourcing of jobs to agencies or
contractors. In other situations, however,
the effects on low-skilled workers appear
to be minimal, and in some situations they
may even be beneficial.
Incidence of Temporary Help and
Contracting Out
We studied the use of temporary
services and contracting out in five
Midwest automotive supply
establishments, six hospitals in Michigan
and North Carolina, and seven Michigan
public school districts.1 Low-skilled jobs
comprise a large share of employment in
all three of the industries studied. The
majority of auto supply workers are in
low- or semi-skilled production positions.
Hospitals have shifted work away from
high-skilled, high-paid registered nurses
to low-skilled, low-paid nurse assistants.
Moreover, hospitals utilize a large
number of workers in low-skilled clerical,
food service, and housekeeping positions.
Typically, 15 to 20 percent of a public
school’s staff is in low- and semi-skilled
noninstructional positions in such areas as
food service, cleaning, and transportation.
The use of temporary agency help in
low-skilled functional areas was common
in our auto supply and hospital case
studies. Contracting out low-skilled
1
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functions was prevalent in hospitals and
public schools. Four out of the five auto
supply plants utilized temporary agency
help in production positions during the
period of our interviews. Among the two
unionized plants in our study, the use of
agency temporaries was strictly limited at
one and prohibited at the other. In two
nonunion plants, temporary employment
accounted for over 20 percent of
production employment.
Although most hospitals in our study
kept poor records of their use of agency
temporary help in support functions, they
reported using agency temps in many
low-skilled clinical, clerical,
housekeeping, and food service positions.
Data from the hospitals that did keep
good records suggest a moderately high
level of temporary employment. For
instance, in one hospital, agency temps
worked 11 percent of hours in food
services, 5 percent of hours in
housekeeping, and 14 percent of hours in
clerical functions.
We observed several cases in public
schools where noninstructional support
services, including custodial,
transportation, and food services
operations, were entirely contracted out.
Interestingly, however, it is quite common
for hospitals and public schools to
contract out only management functions
and to keep workers on their payroll.
Whereas all of the hospitals we studied
contracted out the management of food
services or housekeeping services, none
contracted out the entire operation.
Among public schools, two districts
contracted out their entire food services
operation, but three contracted out only
the management function.
Implications for Workers
In several instances, management
decisions to use agency temporaries or to
contract out functions appeared to have a
direct, adverse effect on the wages,
benefits, or other working conditions of
low-skilled workers.2 These cases
involved the substitution of agency or
contract company staff for regular
employees on a long-term basis.
Sometimes, contracting out entailed loss
of union status and benefits, for affected
workers, such as due process in grievance
2
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procedures. The contracting out of an
entire low-skilled function in public
schools was always associated with lower
benefits and sometimes lower wages for
workers in these occupations. By law,
public school employees received pension
and other benefits, which were
considerably more generous than those
typically offered in the private sector to
low-skilled workers. In addition, wage
levels of contracted workers tended to be
lower than those paid to school
employees, who were often unionized. A
1994 Michigan law precluding union
bargaining over the contracting out of
noninstructional services, coupled with
financial pressures on public schools,
have led to a recent surge of contracting
out of these services.
In only one case—that of an auto
supplier—did an employer use temporary
agency workers on a long-term basis. This
auto supplier screened all new hires

Unless an organization’s lowskilled employees are earning
above market compensation,
management will have little to
gain in terms of wage and
benefits cost savings from the
use of agency temporaries and
contractors. Where we observe
such use, the organization’s
motivation is something else.
through a temporary help agency and
offered them permanent positions after six
months to a year or more—far longer than
other auto suppliers using temporary
agencies for screening purposes. This
nonunion supplier paid its regular workers
wages and benefits comparable to
unionized plants in the area, a strategy
designed to improve the quality of its
employees and to avoid unionization.
However, in prolonging the probationary
period in its hiring through a temporary
agency, the company acknowledged
substantial savings in wage and benefits
costs.
Interestingly, the human resources
directors at the unionized auto supplier
plants also indicated that they would like

to be able to use temporary agency
workers more to save on labor costs.
However, unlike the situation in public
schools, unions in this sector were able to
prohibit or greatly restrict the use of
temporary agencies through collective
bargaining. These examples underscore
the importance that laws governing
collective bargaining have on the
incidence of outsourcing and ultimately
on compensation and other working
conditions in an industry.
Although outsourcing is often
associated with the substitution of agency
or contract company workers for higherpaid regular workers, evidence from our
case studies suggests that outsourcing
typically did not involve such substitution
on a permanent basis. Agency
temporaries usually were hired on a shortterm basis to fill in for an absent
employee, to staff a temporary project, or
to screen workers for permanent
positions. Particularly in hospitals,
agency temporaries’ compensation was
similar to that of regular staff in
comparable positions; in a few cases, they
even earned more.
Only the management function was
contracted out in almost all of the
instances of contracting out in hospitals
and in about half of the instances in public
schools, so the wages and benefits of lowskilled workers in these functional areas
were unaffected. In these cases, schools
and hospitals believed any wage and
benefits cost savings from contracting out
the entire function were non-existent or
relatively small: the motivation for
contracting out the management function
was to achieve product or productivity
improvements and cost savings in other
areas.
The simple but important point is that
unless an organization’s low-skilled
employees are earning above market
compensation, management will have
little to gain—and workers will have little
to lose—in terms of wage and benefits
cost savings from the use of agency
temporaries and contractors. Where we
observe such use, the organization’s
motivation is something else.
A caveat to this conclusion is that
compensation among regular employees
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likely depends on the existence of
competition from staffing agencies and
contractors. It will be difficult for lowskilled workers and their union
representatives to raise compensation if
employers have the option of using lowcost third parties. We observed this sort
of dynamic in one of our public school
case studies. The previously mentioned
state law, which precluded collective
bargaining over the contracting out of
noninstructional services, paved the way
for this school district to contract out the
custodial services in some of its
buildings. The union was able to
continue operating in half of the
buildings, but only because it agreed to
steep pay cuts for its higher-paid
custodians and to the disciplining of poor
performers.
Potential Benefit: The Case of Temporary Agencies and “Risky” Workers
When can workers actually benefit
from a temporary agency or contract
arrangement? Some workers, of course,
prefer temporary positions. Workers may
benefit from superior management skills
provided by a contractor. More
interesting is the use of temporary help
agencies for screening purposes. Here,
we argue, agency temporaries may benefit
from the arrangement, even when they
desire permanent positions and receive
lower wages than direct hires.
The use of agency temporaries for
screening purposes increased during the
late 1990s among employers in our case
studies as labor markets tightened and the
average quality of job applicants dropped.
Some of these employers began hiring
workers for certain low-skilled positions
exclusively through temporary agencies.
Others used a mixed hiring strategy. For
instance, one auto supplier directly hired
applicants with good work histories while
hiring others through a temporary agency
at lower wages and lower cost to the
company.
By lowering compensation and firing
costs, temporary help agencies made it
more attractive for companies to try out
workers with criminal records, poor work
histories, or otherwise “risky”
characteristics. Because many of these
workers might not otherwise have had the
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opportunity to audition for a permanent
position, they potentially benefited from
the temporary employment arrangement.
At the same time, by lowering the
companies’ costs of trying out riskier
workers, temporary help agencies
effectively expand the supply of potential
labor to a company. In this way,
companies may avoid raising wages in
order to attract more qualified candidates.
Furthermore, because increases in wages
for new workers are almost always
accompanied by increases in wages for
existing workers, the more general use of
agency temporaries may relieve upward
wage pressure in tight labor markets.3
Conclusion
Sometimes an organization’s
motivation for outsourcing low-skilled
jobs is to substitute lower-paid temporary
agency or contract company workers for
regular employees. Often, however, an
organization’s motivation for outsourcing
is unrelated to wage and benefits cost
savings. Workers in low-skilled positions
may already receive relatively low pay,
and outsourcing involves no permanent
substitution of temporary or contract
company workers for regular employees.
Except to the extent that the existence of
an outsourcing option inhibits
compensation gains among low-skilled
workers, contracting out and the use of
agency temporaries has little apparent
effect on low-skilled workers.
The growing use of temporary
agencies to screen workers for permanent
positions illustrates the complexity of
assessing the impacts of temporary
agency work on low-skilled workers. Our
case study evidence suggests that often
workers hired through agencies are
deemed riskier than those hired directly,
rendering simple wage comparisons
between these two groups invalid.
Moreover, the fact that temporary
agencies sometimes lower compensation
costs and facilitate dismissal may be the
very reason some employers are willing
to try out certain workers. The potentially
more important impacts of temporary
employment are on workers’ subsequent
employment and earnings. The extent to
which temporary agencies help open
doors to good jobs for low-skilled, risky

workers or instead channel them into lowpaying, dead-end assignments is an
important topic for future study.
Notes
1. We conducted extensive interviews with each
organization’s managers, temporary agency or contract company representatives, and workers. We also
collected data on employment, wages, and benefits
by occupation for regular, temporary agency, and
contract workers from each organization.
2. An obvious caveat to the conclusion that
lower wages and benefits adversely affect workers is
that lower compensation may increase employment
and reduce unemployment in the long run. While
these long-term impacts are hotly debated in the
economics profession, we do not consider such macroeconomic effects here.
3. We develop these arguments, including why
employers may need a third party to lower the costs
of trying out risky workers, in Houseman, Kalleberg, and Erickcek (2001).
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